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INTRODUCTION
Since 1934, four “organic laws” of the United States have prefaced the
volumes of the U.S. Code: the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of

† Associate Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; J.D./Ph.D. in American Legal History,
University of Pennsylvania. For feedback on the article in progress, I thank Will Baude, Jud
Campbell, Nathan Chapman, Sam Erman, Craig Green, Sophia Lee, and Jim Pfander.
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Confederation, the U.S. Constitution, and the Northwest Ordinance.2
Formally an ordinary statute that established the first federal territory, the
Ordinance’s exalted company suggests its exceptional status within the
nation’s constitutional history.3 The Ordinance’s protections of freedom of
worship, private property, and jury trials, and its ban on “cruel or unusual
punishments,” all prefigured, sometimes verbatim, the provisions of the Bill
of Rights.4 Its prohibition on slavery rendered the Ohio River the ostensible
divide between “free” and “slave” territory,5 while the document’s promise to
admit the territories as future states “on an equal footing” with other states
became a foundational principle of federalism.6 And the law’s requirement
that the “utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians,” even
as it anticipated that “[I]ndian titles shall have been extinguished,” epitomized
the contradictory and often hypocritical nature of U.S. settler colonialism.7
But, while historians and legal scholars have thoroughly explored the
Ordinance’s quasi-constitutional aspects, they have largely ignored most of

1 U.S.C., at XLV–LXXV (2012).
For the original text of the Ordinance, see 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
1774–1789, at 334-43 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936) [hereinafter NORTHWEST ORDINANCE]. The
Ordinance was reenacted after the adoption of the Constitution with minor alterations to conform
to the new constitutional system. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51-53.
4 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 340. For examples of recent works that read the
Ordinance in light of the Constitution, see generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 258-62 (2012);
PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
(1987); Matthew J. Festa, Property and Republicanism in the Northwest Ordinance, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 409
(2013); Denis P. Duffey, Note, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 929 (1995); Matthew J. Hegreness, Note, An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment:
The Northwest Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and Immunities, 120 YALE L.J. 1820 (2011).
5 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 343. Multiple scholars have traced how this
provision nonetheless failed to eliminate slavery in the Northwest Territory and the states carved
from it. See generally M. SCOTT HEERMAN, THE ALCHEMY OF SLAVERY: HUMAN BONDAGE AND
EMANCIPATION IN THE ILLINOIS COUNTRY, 1730–1865 (2018); MATTHEW SALAFIA, SLAVERY’S
BORDERLAND: FREEDOM AND BONDAGE ALONG THE OHIO RIVER (2013); Paul Finkelman,
Slavery and the Northwest Ordinance: A Study in Ambiguity, 6 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 343 (1986).
6 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 342; accord Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579-80
(1911) (ruling that Congress cannot require conditions for admission to the Union that would impair
a new state’s equal standing). On this aspect of the Ordinance, see Robert S. Hill, Federalism,
Republicanism, and the Northwest Ordinance, 18 PUBLIUS 41, 49 (1988) (“The commitment to equal
statehood has the character of a sacred pledge.”); Peter S. Onuf, New State Equality: The Ambiguous
History of a Constitutional Principle, 18 PUBLIUS 53, 54-57 (1988) (explaining how the Court
constitutionalized the “equal footing” principle by prohibiting restrictive state admission
conditions).
7 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 337, 340. For discussion of the Ordinance’s
implications for Native peoples, see Robert F. Berkhofer, Americans Versus Indians: The Northwest
Ordinance, Territory Making, and Native Americans, 84 IND. MAG. HIST. 90, 92-95 (1988); Jack N.
Rakove, Ambiguous Achievement: The Northwest Ordinance, in THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE:
ESSAYS ON ITS FORMULATION, PROVISIONS, AND LEGACY 1, 2 (Frederick D. Williams ed., 1989).
2
3
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what the Ordinance actually did: create a structure of governance.8 In the
Ordinance, Congress delegated executive, legislative, and judicial power over
the Northwest Territory, subject to limits imposed by Congress, to five
presidentially selected and congressionally confirmed federal officials: a
governor serving a three-year term; a secretary (effectively lieutenant
governor) serving a four-year term; and three judges who served during good
behavior.9 The governor and judges collectively served as the territorial
legislature, at least until there were “five thousand free male inhabitants,” when
the Ordinance authorized an elected “general assembly.”10 Until that point, too,
the territorial governor appointed all local “magistrates and other civil officers.”11
Viewed anachronistically, territorial government under the Ordinance
strongly resembled the modern administrative state: it explicitly empowered
federal officials within the executive branch12 to exercise “binding legislative
and judicial power” over U.S. citizens.13 Yet surprisingly, the early history of
the territories has played almost no role in the intensifying scholarly debates
over administrative law’s constitutional legitimacy.14 Even scholars who
8 See generally R. Douglas Hurt, Historians and the Northwest Ordinance, 20 W. HIST. Q. 261
(1989) (providing an overview of the Ordinance’s historiography). As Hurt notes, an older strand of
scholarship did focus on the imposed and arguably undemocratic nature of the Ordinance. See id. at
267-69.
9 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 335-36. The reenactment of the Ordinance after
the Constitution’s ratification substituted presidential for congressional appointment of territorial
officials. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat. 50, 52-53.
10 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 336-37.
11 Id.
12 The territorial governor and secretary were officers of the United States who reported to the
Secretary of State. The status of territorial courts and judges was unstated, but the evidence strongly
suggests that they were not considered part of the Article III judiciary, as the Court would later rule.
See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (describing territorial courts as “legislative
Courts” as opposed to “constitutional Courts, in which the judicial power [is] conferred by the
Constitution”). As Jerry Mashaw points out, the Salary Act of 1789 listed the “three judges of the
‘western territory’” as “Executive Officers.” Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative
Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1288 (2006). Moreover, although those
three congressionally appointed territorial judges served during good behavior, NORTHWEST
ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 336—a provision abandoned in later federal territories—lower court
territorial judges were unambiguously not Article III judges: they were appointed by the governor
and served during his pleasure, ANDREW R. L. CAYTON, THE FRONTIER REPUBLIC: IDEOLOGY
AND POLITICS IN THE OHIO COUNTRY, 1780–1825 65-66 (1986). The Judiciary Act of 1789, which
established the lower federal courts, contained no mention of the territorial courts, see Act of Sept.
24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; and, until 1805, there was no provision for appeal from the territorial
courts to the U.S. Supreme Court, see Act of March 3, 1805, ch. 38, 2 Stat. 338, 338-39.
13 PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 4 (2014).
14 This absence is particularly surprising given that Gary Lawson, one of the strongest critics
of the constitutionality of administrative law, has also written extensively on the constitutional law
of American empire. See, e.g., GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE:
TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (2004); Gary Lawson, The Rise and
Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (opining that “[t]he post-New
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recognize the broad scope of early federal administrative practice posit the
existence of a constitutional “hole where administration might have been,”15
notwithstanding the Constitution’s grant of power to Congress to craft “all
needful Rules and Regulations” for federal territories16—a provision adopted,
James Madison suggested, specifically to validate the Northwest Ordinance.17
This omission of the territories from discussions of administrative law’s
history reflects two related assumptions. The first is that early federal
territorial governance, although authorized by Congress, actually rested on
“local legislative power that comes from below.”18 Superficially, the
Ordinance’s language supports this claim: it closely resembled state
constitutions grounded in popular sovereignty and even purported to be an
“unalterable” “compact” between existing and future states.19 Yet in reality,
the Ordinance imposed and staffed a government almost entirely from above.
The people governed by the Ordinance had no say in its creation or adoption:
Congress enacted it without any process for ratification or assent, and
territorial citizens lacked voting representation in Congress. Governance
within the Territory was also arguably undemocratic. Until the territory’s
population reached 5,000 white men, at which point the Ordinance
authorized an elected legislature (its sole concession to self-governance),
there were no territorial officials selected by, or representing, the governed.20
As the U.S. Attorney General wrote in 1799, “[t]he governor and all persons
in authority [in the Northwest Territory] derive their authority from the
present constitution of the United States or from Congress . . . .”21
The second and related assumption is that the territories were
exceptional, “anomalous zones” whose governance through federal fiat

Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system amounts to
nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution”).
15 JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 29-33 (2012); but see Maggie McKinley,
Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE L. J. 1538, 1600-11 (2018) (rooting the
subsequent administrative state—which she dubs the “participatory state”—in the Petititons Clause).
16 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
17 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, at 191-92 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
18 HAMBURGER, supra note 13, at 389-90; see also William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article
III,
133
HARV.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2020)
(manuscript
at
12-20),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3194945
[https://perma.cc/P4WS-7QCH]
(arguing that territorial courts exercise the judicial power of their territory rather than of the United
States). The Supreme Court recently rejected the argument that the territories derive their authority
from popular sovereignty as a matter of doctrine. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863,
1874 (2016).
19 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 339-40.
20 Id. at 337.
21 Letter from Attorney General to Secretary of State (Aug. 22, 1799), in 3 THE TERRITORIAL
PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 66, 66-67 (Clarence Edward Carter ed., 1934).
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reflected expediency rather than constitutional principle.22 Some
commentators have even suggested that large swaths of the Northwest
Ordinance are unconstitutional, an odd claim for a text long thought to be
foundational to U.S. constitutional thought.23 Not only does such an
approach improbably disregard what the drafters of the Constitution
repeatedly said the text meant, it also ignores over two centuries of
governmental practice, which even those who emphasize textualism concede
has an important role in constructing constitutional meaning.24 As for the
suggestion that the territories were a minor exception to “normal” structures
of constitutional governance, this assertion, dubiously descriptive of the
present, is particularly inapposite for the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. As a number of commentators have emphasized, the territories
represented one of the most significant sites of federal governance in the early
United States;25 they also empowered Congress, through its control over
admission to statehood, to dictate the nation’s political future.26
Consequently, as even a casual glance at U.S. constitutional history reveals,
the territories were fundamental to nearly every major constitutional
controversy of the long nineteenth century: most notably slavery,27 but also

22 See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 31-58 (2009) (describing how early
American’ ambitions for geographic expansion “raised quandaries about the relationship between
territoriality and sovereignty”); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1,
250 (2002) (arguing that the Court’s jurisprudence on the territories “reflected an approach to
national sovereignty radically different from the concepts of enumerated powers and limited
government, with powers reserved to the states and the people, that inspired the Constitution”);
Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1200-01 (1996) (defining an “anomalous
zone” as “a geographical area in which certain legal rules, otherwise regarded as embodying
fundamental policies of the larger legal system, are locally suspended”).
23 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV.
853, 907-08, 910 (1990) (explaining that “[a] strict reading of the text and structure of the
Constitution—my formalist approach—leads to conclusions almost certainly at odds with the
intentions of most of the relevant participants in the Constitution’s framing and adoption,” including
an elected territorial legislature and a non-Article III judiciary).
24 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (“[T]he longstanding ‘practice of
the government’ can inform our determination of ‘what the law is.’”) (citations omitted); William
Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (tracing how long-established and settled
practice can “liquidate” the meaning of ambiguous constitutional provisions).
25 See generally BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF
NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 185-97 (2009); WILLIAM H.
BERGMANN, THE AMERICAN NATIONAL STATE AND THE EARLY WEST (2012).
26 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (granting Congress the power to admit new states into the
union and requiring its consent for territorial changes to existing states).
27 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 431-32 (1856) (resolving the
interconnected questions of federal authority over the territories and the congressional power to bar
the importation of slaves).
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religious freedom,28 property ownership,29 racial discrimination,30
citizenship,31 and the scope and nature of constitutional rights.32
The language of exception does important work in the present, however,
because it preserves a particular vision of the “Founding.” Administrative law,
we are told, was a relic of British legal thought consciously repudiated in the
American Revolution, which insisted that law be rooted in popular
sovereignty.33 This forward-looking perspective of a world made anew echoes
revolutionary-era rhetoric, yet it ignores a more complicated relationship
between federal governance and its imperial antecedents. As recent legal
histories have demonstrated, British precedents and thought remained deeply
entangled within the new nation’s constitutional project.34
This backward-looking view was particularly significant for territorial
governance. Often discussed as the “colonies” of the new nation,35 the
territories directly raised the question of how the center could legitimately
govern the periphery—the questions of imperial constitutional structure that
had prompted the Revolution. Early Americans, who routinely spoke of the
United States as an empire,36 recognized this parallel. As James Monroe
stated of an early version of what became the Northwest Ordinance, “It is in

28 See, e.g., SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 49, 65 (2002) (describing
Congress’s attempts to intervene in marriage practices in the Territory of Utah).
29 See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, The Rise of Federal Title, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 631, 658-59 (2018)
(highlighting how the federal government used its authority in the territories to rework the meaning
of property).
30 See, e.g., KATE MASUR, AN EXAMPLE FOR ALL THE LAND: EMANCIPATION AND THE
STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 223-25, 232 (2010) (describing the
complicated relationship between African Americans and the territorial government and ways in
which African Americans strove to obtain racial equality).
31 See, e.g., SAM ERMAN, ALMOST CITIZENS: PUERTO RICO, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, AND
EMPIRE (2018) (recounting litigation over the citizenship status of residents in the U.S. territories).
32 See infra Part II.
33 See generally HAMBURGER, supra note 13.
34 For works exploring the interrelationship between pre-revolutionary precedents and
subsequent constitutional practice in the early United States, see generally MARY SARAH BILDER,
THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004);
DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830 (2005); and ALISON L. LACROIX,
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 44-59, 79-80 (2010).
35 See infra Part II.A.
36 For the uses of the term “empire” and its meanings in the early United States, see PETER
S. ONUF, JEFFERSON’S EMPIRE: THE LANGUAGE OF AMERICAN NATIONHOOD 53-61 (2000);
JAMES G. WILSON, THE IMPERIAL REPUBLIC: A STRUCTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 11 (2002).
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effect to be a colonial govt similar to that w[hic]h prevail’d in these States
previous to the revolution . . . .”37
The early territories reveal, then, the limits of popular sovereignty in the
United States—not only because, as present-day scholars have stressed, the
nation explicitly excluded women, African-Americans, and Native peoples
from governance, but also because territorial governance failed to include the
people, however narrowly defined, in making the laws that governed them.
Unlike most present-day commentators, territorial citizens readily grasped
this imperial aspect of the Northwest Ordinance, which proved controversial.
Territorial politics, wracked by intense constitutional debates, sometimes
made it seem as though the American Revolution had never really ended, as
territorial citizens litigated issues that the war had supposedly settled. Here,
I focus on two particularly contentious questions of the 1790s with close
parallels in the imperial crisis: the relationship between military and civil
authority, and the uncertain jurisdictional and constitutional status of the
territories within the United States.
Yet, for all that territorial constitutional debates closely resembled
revolutionary controversies, they unfolded quite differently. The key
difference was not the existence of a written U.S. constitution: although the
Northwest Territory actually had two authoritative constitutional documents,
given the Ordinance’s claim to fundamental law, constitutional argument
there maintained the eclecticism of sources that had long characterized early
American constitutionalism.38 What marked the Northwest Territory, rather,
was the limited institutional scope for these constitutional arguments. Until
1805, for instance, there was no appeal from territorial courts to the U.S.
Supreme Court.39 Congress and the executive both enjoyed considerable
power over the territories, but both, preoccupied by geopolitics, showed little
interest in intervening in quotidian local disputes. The outcome was a sort of
administrative constitutionalism by default, as the governor, secretary, and
judges/legislators often had to hash out these questions themselves. Their
arguments produced much disagreement but little resolution: Secretary of State
Edmund Randolph dismissively referred to the territory’s records as “little
more, than a history of bickerings and discontents.”40
37 Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (May 11, 1786), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MONROE 298, 298-99 (Daniel Preston & Marlena C. DeLong eds., 2006).
38 See generally JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018).
39 See Clarke v. Bazadone, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 212, 214 (1803) (ruling that the Supreme Court
could not take a case from the Northwest Territory because an “act of congress had not authorized
an appeal or writ of error”), superseded by statute, Act of March 3, 1805, supra note 11 (authorizing the
Supreme Court to review appeals from territorial courts).
40 Letter from Secretary of State to President (Jan. 4, 1794), in 2 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS
OF THE UNITED STATES 472, 472-73 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1934).
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Ironically, these bickerings were among the earliest discussions of some
of the most fundamental constitutional questions in U.S. history, issues that
endure into the present. But this history of early debate in the territories was
lost. One consequence of ignoring this early administrative constitutionalism
is the assumption, beginning with the Louisiana Purchase and going forward,
that questions about, for instance, the Constitution’s geographic scope, were
new, the result of changed circumstances. In fact, as the history presented
here suggests, the uncertainties and contradictions raised by territorial
governance existed from the beginning.
I. CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITY IN THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY
The early U.S. Army was small. Even at the height of the war against the
Northwest Indian Confederacy in the early 1790s, the army only amounted to
a few thousand soldiers.41 Yet the army loomed large in the Northwest
Territory, where nearly the entire federal military was stationed. Part of what
made the Northwest Territory an imperial space was the presence of federal
military power, with the attendant threat of raw force and violence.
The existence of the military in the midst of civilians made for an uneasy
division of authority. In particular, two interrelated constitutional issues
arose. The first was the exercise of military jurisdiction over civilians; the
second was the extent to which civil authority extended over internal military
matters. Both raised uncomfortable memories of the imperial crisis in a
nation that had decried British tyranny for “render[ing] the Military
independent of and superior to the Civil power.”42 Drawing the boundaries
between military and civil authority plagued the Territory with “jostleings of
the executive, judicial, and military powers”—a contest “always pregnant with
evils,” in the words of one territorial judge.43
A. Military Jurisdiction over Civilians
Anglo-American law, especially as interpreted by the citizens of the new
nation, was hostile to military rule, with its connotations of despotism.
Anxieties over a standing army figured prominently in Anti-Federalist
critiques of the Constitution, and suspicion of military authority remained

41 On the history of the early federal military, see generally RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND
SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN
AMERICA, 1783–1802 (1975).
42 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776).
43 Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Winthrop Sargent (June 30, 1792), in Winthrop Sargent
Papers (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 3).
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widespread.44 But, while some in the Washington Administration shared this
skepticism, others, particularly Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton and Secretary of War Henry Knox, regarded the creation of a
functional national army as one of the core purposes of the new Constitution.
To them, the military’s hierarchical, top-down structure promised the “energy”
for enforcing federal law lacking under the Articles of Confederation.45
The use of the army for law enforcement was particularly prominent in
the Northwest Territory prior to the adoption of the Northwest Ordinance,
when no formal civil authority existed. To fill this jurisdictional void,
Congress granted the military exceptional authority, charging it with
expelling illegal settlers from lands north of the Ohio River.46 One army
commander, relishing the opportunity to “give them [the settlers] federal
Law,” ordered his soldiers to evict settlers, destroy their crops, and burn their
homes.47 This pattern persisted throughout the existence of the Northwest
Territory: in 1799, Joshua Fleeheart had his salt works on Indian land completely
destroyed by the army, allegedly resulting in over $2000 in damages.48
The army’s status as the only Anglo-American institution with
jurisdiction over much of the Northwest Territory also led the military to act
as a quasi-judicial institution. In one case, there being “no tribunal” under
civil law, the commander at a local fort, Captain Asheton, made himself judge
in a local debt dispute.49 Finding for the debtor, this ad hoc proceeding
ordered that the creditor receive forty lashes for taking the debtor’s axe as
partial repayment of the debt.50
Even after the enactment of the Northwest Ordinance, army officers were
loath to concede the authority they had amassed. Some officials asserted that
the long-settled French habitants of the region favored military rule: “the
44 See SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE
DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828 28 (1999) (identifying “[f]ears about the creation
of a standing army” as one of Anti-Federalists’ five main critiques of the Constitution); KOHN, supra
note 41, at 73-88 (stressing “public apprehension about standing armies” in constitutional debates).
45 See KOHN, supra note 41, at 54-72 (describing the weaknesses of the Confederation-era
military); see also MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 47-58 (2003) (arguing
that the creation of a “fiscal-military state” was one of the purposes of the Constitution).
46 Congress later codified this authority in the Trade and Intercourse Acts. See Act of May 19,
1796, ch. 30, § 5, 1 Stat. 469, 470; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, § 5, 1 Stat. 329, 330.
47 Letter from Josiah Harmar to Henry Knox (Aug. 4, 1786), in Josiah Harmar Papers, (on file
with the Clements Library, University of Michigan, Vol. 28, Letterbook A).
48 See Affidavit, Flaherty v. Chribbs (May 1, 1801), (on file with Knox County Public Library,
Vincennes,
Ind.,
Knox
County
Court
File
Box
7,
File
562),
http://visions.indstate.edu:8888/cdm/ref/collection/ving/id/11900 [https://perma.cc/H4N2-GLC3].
49 Letter from Michael Lacassagne to George Washington (Oct. 26, 1789), in 4 PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 229, 229-32 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1993), available
at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-0162 [https://perma.cc/XC75-72HY].
50 See id.
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command or order of the Military commandant is better law and spedier [sic]
justice for them & what they prefer,” one territorial judge reported, “to all
the legal systems found in Littleton and Blackstone.”51 Officers were also
dubious about the efficacy of civil institutions in the Territory. In the raucous
Anglo-American settlements newly made along the Ohio River, the
inhabitants’ “uncontrouled–Licentiousness [sic]” supposedly made it
impossible to govern them through juries, constables, and justices of the
peace.52 “[W]e Shall never have good government in this County,” one local
magistrate grumbled, “till we have a Military Establishment to enforce the
laws and Create Respect for the Government.”53
Yet the principal argument advanced in favor of military jurisdiction was
necessity. Exercising military authority over civilians under a “free
Government,” was, territorial secretary Winthrop Sargent acknowledged,
“very delicate,” yet the military was the only institution capable of exercising
authority in a place “totally destitute of the Benefits of civil Law &
Magistrates.”54 A military officer similarly argued that the Territory’s “present
situation” made military authority “necessary.”55 “Civil Law is an admirable
institution any where,” the officer wrote, “except on a frontier situated in the
center of an Indian Country and in a time of War.”56
Territorial citizens sharply disagreed. Steeped in the imperial crisis, they
insisted that military authority over civilians was “subversive of those
principles established by the American revolution.”57 At every turn, military
and federal officials confronted citizens wielding legal arguments against their
jurisdiction. The “intruders” living north of the Ohio, for instance, bitterly
protested that the military lacked the authority to remove them.58 One of the
most heated responses came from Michael Lacassange, a Kentucky merchant
who wrote directly to President Washington to protest Captain Asheton’s
intervention in the debt dispute (which involved two of Lacassagne’s
tenants).59 Surely the President would not permit an American citizen to be

51 Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Robert Morris (June 22, 1790), in THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN CLEVES SYMMES 290, 290 (Beverley Bond, Jr. ed., 1926)
52 Letter from Acting Governor Sargent to Governor St. Clair (Feb. 12, 1793), in 2
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 40, at 433.
53 Letter from William St. Clair to Arthur St. Clair (Oct. 25, 1794), in Arthur St. Clair Papers
(on file with the Ohio Historical Society, Roll 4).
54 Letter from Winthrop Sargent to John Francis Hamtramck (July 16, 1790), in 3
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 21, at 321.
55 Letter from John Francis Hamtramck to Secretary of War (Mar. 31, 1792), in 2 TERRITORIAL
PAPERS, supra note 40, at 381.
56 Id. at 381.
57 Lacassange to Washington, supra note 49.
58 ONUF, supra note 4, at 28-33.
59 See Lacassange to Washington, supra note 49.
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deprived of rights purchased through “so much blood and treasure” in the
Revolution.60 To such a citizen, Lacassange asserted, being subjected to the
arbitrary punishment of a military officer like Asheton “must be worse than
death itself.”61
As these instances demonstrate, civilians constantly challenged military
efforts to claim jurisdiction over them. In these contests, complaints to
superiors sometimes proved an effective check against perceived military
overreach. Lacassange’s complaint, for instance, produced an investigation
and a court of inquiry (which apparently ultimately vindicated Asheton),62
while allegations that Northwest Territorial Governor Arthur St. Clair had
overstepped his authority prompted a cautionary letter from President
Washington warning him to exercise “the utmost circumspection.”63 Even on
a distant frontier, federal officials were well aware of scrutiny of their actions
from Philadelphia, which often served as the most effective limit on their
behavior.
Yet appeals to the administration took months, even years, to resolve, if
they were ever addressed at all. Many inhabitants of the territory turned to
what seemed a speedier source of justice: local magistrates and courts. As a
result, the question of military jurisdiction over civilians quickly transformed
into a fight over the scope of civilian jurisdiction over the military; it also
became a bitter struggle among territorial officials.
B. Civil Jurisdiction over the Military
Federal officials in the Northwest Territory had sharply differing views on
the proper relationship between military and civil authority. The Territory’s
executives, Governor Arthur St. Clair and Secretary Winthrop Sargent, had
both served in the Continental Army and now held military as well as civil
positions in the new federal government.64 Both were deeply committed to
establishing national authority over a region that the federal government only
tenuously controlled and believed the military was central to that project.
Creating a robust military presence, St. Clair argued, would ensure that
“[t]he People . . . saw and felt that the Government of the Union was not a
mere shadow: their progeny . . . would learn to reverence the Government.”65
Id.
Id.
See id. at n.3.
Letter from President Washington to Gov. Arthur St. Clair (Jan. 2, 1791), in 2 TERRITORIAL
PAPERS, supra note 40, at 321.
64 See CAYTON, supra note 12, at 14-17, 25-26 (providing brief biographies of St. Clair and
Sargent).
65 Letter from Arthur St. Clair to the President (Aug. 1789), in 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra
note 40, at 212.
60
61
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They did not advocate for military rule—St. Clair refused calls to use the
army to enforce civil law because it was “not the business of [the] military”—
but rather embraced a conception of separate spheres in which military and
civilian authority were kept “perfectly distinct.”66
This vision of non-interference put St. Clair and Sargent at odds with
two of the territorial judges, John Cleves Symmes and George Turner.
Military and civil authority were not coequal, the judges insisted: rather, as
Symmes stated, “The military force of the nation is always considered as
subordinate to . . . the civil arm.”67 Symmes went so far as to insist that, rather
than enjoying any special jurisdictional status, “soldiers are merely members
of the community,” likening them to “students in a college.”68
These differing views primed these officials for the confrontations that
followed. The growth of the Northwest Territory in the early 1790s, as land
sales lured many Anglo-American settlers down to Ohio, made collisions
between military and civil jurisdiction even more likely. These tensions
peaked in Cincinnati, the Territory’s administrative hub and most important
town.69 As one visitor passing through during this period summarized the
conflict, “The military want to run things, but the town insists upon its rights
under the constitution, & in consequence there are frequent quarrels.”70
The center of these quarrels, and of Cincinnati, was Fort Washington. In
summer 1791, the fort was a hub of activity, as St. Clair, who was also serving
as the commander of the First American Legion, prepared to lead an
expedition into Indian country.71 Living cheek to jowl, soldiers and civilians
engaged in licit and illicit commerce and altercations, which army
commanders constantly bemoaned subverted military discipline, particularly
when alcohol was involved.
Consistent with his emphasis on noninterference, St. Clair attempted to
forestall conflicts by establishing sharp jurisdictional boundaries. In August
1791, he drew a line around Fort Washington.72 Any civilians who elected to
remain within this district, St. Clair announced, would be considered as

66 Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Judge Turner (June 19, 1791), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS
218, 219-20 (William Henry Smith ed., 1882).
67 Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Arthur St. Clair (July 22, 1791), in Arthur St. Clair
Papers (on file with the Ohio Historical Society, Roll 3).
68 Id.
69 See CAYTON, supra note 12, at 63-67 (recounting the early history of Cincinnati).
70 JOHN GOTTLIEB ERNESTUS HECKEWELDER, THIRTY THOUSAND MILES WITH JOHN
HECKEWELDER 269 (Paul A. W. Wallace ed., 1958).
71 See COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE VICTORY WITH NO NAME: THE NATIVE AMERICAN
DEFEAT OF THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY 61-92 (2014).
72 See Proclamation by His Excellency, Arthur St. Clair (Aug. 23, 1791), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR
PAPERS, supra note 66, at 211-12.
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“voluntarily submit[ting] themselves to the military law.”73 Yet St. Clair’s
effort to separate soldiers from civilians angered Judge Symmes, who informed
St. Clair that this effort to “subject the Citizens of the territory to Military
government” exceeded his authority under the Northwest Ordinance.74
St. Clair and Symmes’s disagreements escalated later that month when a
deserting soldier accused a civilian named Shaw with encouraging him to
desert and even supplying him clothes to do so.75 St. Clair clapped Shaw in
irons; a subsequent search of Shaw’s home unearthed a regimental uniform.76
Asserting authority under the Secretary of War’s orders to expel intruders
from the public lands, St. Clair ordered Shaw’s house burnt and Shaw
banished from the territory.77
Shaw’s detention quickly surfaced broader jurisdictional tensions.
Symmes read Shaw’s detention as part of a pattern of “acts of despotic
complexion”78 that reflected the “superiority which the Governor affected to
give the military over citizens.”79 It would, Symmes feared, only embolden
the army’s officers, who already acted as so many petty tyrants, “beating and
imprisoning citizens at their pleasure.”80 Symmes reported of one officer with
an “imperious disposition,” Captain John Armstrong, who had often feuded
with the local sheriff over the “superiority of the civil or military authority.”81
Now, in the wake of Shaw’s detention, Armstrong reportedly “deridingly t[ook]
the sheriff by the sleeve, saying: ‘what think you of the civil authority now?’”82
For his part, Judge Turner intervened in the controversy by issuing a writ
of habeas corpus for Shaw, even though no complaint had actually been filed
in his court.83 For early Americans, the writ, which required a judicial hearing
to determine the legality of a detention, had acquired almost talismanic

Id. at 212.
Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Arthur St. Clair (July 12, 1791), in Arthur St. Clair
Papers (on file with the Ohio Historical Society, Roll 3).
75 Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Jonathan Dayton (Aug. 15, 1791), in CORRESPONDENCE
OF JOHN CLEVES SYMMES, supra note 51, at 148; Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Henry Knox (Aug.
17, 1791), in Arthur St. Clair Papers (on file with the Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public
Library).
76 Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Henry Knox, supra note 75.
77 Id.
78 Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Jonathan Dayton, supra note 75, at 149.
79 Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Elias Boudinot & Jonathan Dayton (Jan. 25, 1792), in
CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN CLEVES SYMMES, supra note 51, at 161.
80 Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Jonathan Dayton, supra note 75, at 149.
81 Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Elias Boudinot & Jonathan Dayton, supra note 79, at
161.
82 Id.
83 Letter from Judge Turner to Arthur St. Clair (Aug. 12, 1791), in Arthur St. Clair Papers (on
file with the Ohio Historical Society, Roll 3).
73
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significance as a check against arbitrary authority,84 and was protected in both
the U.S. Constitution85 and the Northwest Ordinance.86 But, to Turner’s
shock, St. Clair refused to honor the writ, claiming that Shaw, as an intruder,
was “not entitled to the benefit of the Laws of the Land.”87 An outraged
Turner insisted that the authority of civil law was not geographically limited
by quasi-military spaces. “I know of no corner or garrison in any county of
this Territory into which civil process may not run,” he wrote.88
Because neither St. Clair nor Turner acknowledged the legitimacy of the
other’s claim to authority, what might have been a judicial dispute became a
brittle contest of wills that played out in correspondence rather than a
courtroom. The only option was appeal to some higher authority that both
might concede enjoyed the power to decide. With no higher court holding
jurisdiction, territorial officials looked up the administrative chain, to the
Washington Administration, for vindication. Both St. Clair and Judge
Symmes voiced their grievances to their higher-ups, while Symmes’s formal
complaint against Captain Armstrong was dispatched to the President.89 Yet
the Administration remained silent on these issues, at least publicly. Privately,
the Secretary of State recommended to the President that these issues be left
to the local courts to resolve.90
In the absence of any official resolution, the unsettled question of civil
jurisdiction over the military resurfaced during the following summer of 1792.
The army, having suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Northwest
Indian Confederacy in November, retreated to Cincinnati demoralized and
fractious.91 General James Wilkinson, who replaced St. Clair as military
commander (St. Clair remained the governor of the Northwest Territory),
sought to restore order through vigorous enforcement of military discipline.
On Wilkinson’s orders, an ensign named Harrison harshly punished an

84 See, e.g., AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF
LONDON TO GUANTANAMO BAY 123-40 (2017) (quoting contemporaneous statements that habeas
corpus was “essential to freedom”).
85 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
86 See NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 340 (“The Inhabitants of the said territory
shall always be entitled to the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, and of the trial by Jury.”).
87 Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Judge Turner (Aug. 12, 1791), in Arthur St. Clair Papers (on
file with the Ohio Historical Society, Roll 3).
88 Letter from Judge Turner to Arthur St. Clair, supra note 83.
89 Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Henry Knox, supra note 75; Letter from Secretary of State
to President (Mar. 28, 1792), in 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 40, at 379.
90 Letter from Secretary of State to President, supra note 89, at 379.
91 See CALLOWAY, supra note 71, at 116 (describing how St. Clair’s troops were “[p]oorly
trained, badly provisioned and equipped, dispirited by a month of frustrating delays, tedious
marches, cold wet weather, desertions, and dissension”).
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“artificier,” the term for a craftsman who assisted the military.92 The artificier
then hired two local attorneys, Blanchard and Smith, who filed suit for assault
against Ensign Harrison in the territorial courts.93
Angered by this “interference of the civil authority” in internal military
discipline, General Wilkinson forbade the service of process within Fort
Washington.94 Claiming a “sacred regard” for “civil rights,” Wilkinson
nonetheless feared the consequences if his authority over military personnel
could be second-guessed by magistrates.95 Already, he lamented, “[t]he
Precedent has infected the Corps of Artificiers & the Soldiers with the Idea
of licentious Freedom,” threatening “Anarchy & disorder.”96
Wilkinson appealed to Secretary Sargent, who was acting as governor
during one of St. Clair’s many absences from the Territory. Sargent disagreed
with Wilkinson’s implicit assumption that he had the authority to reject civil
jurisdiction—“[T]here is no Sanctuary from the sovereign Authority of Civil
Law,” Sargent lectured the General—but he was also hostile to the attorneys’
efforts to intervene in military matters.97 Informed of the controversy,
Secretary of War Knox wrote to Sargent in support, stating his belief that
“the civil power has nothing to do with military discipline.”98 Sargent then
wrote Judge Symmes, urging him to “avoid all Infringement of military Police
so essential to the Existence of an Army” by dismissing the suit.99
Symmes was an unsympathetic audience for Sargent’s pleas. The judge
conceded that the civil courts might be barred from interference with military
justice.100 But whether Harrison fell under military jurisdiction in the first
place “is most surely the province of a court of justice to determine.”101 In
other words, civil, not military, authorities held the power to decide the scope
of their respective jurisdictions.

92 Letter from James Wilkinson to Winthrop Sargent (June 2, 1792), in Winthrop Sargent
Papers (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 3). For a biography aimed at a popular
audience recounting Wilkinson’s checkered career, see generally ANDRO LINKLATER, AN ARTIST
IN TREASON: THE EXTRAORDINARY DOUBLE LIFE OF GENERAL JAMES WILKINSON (2009).
93 Letter from James Wilkinson to Winthrop Sargent, supra note 92.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Letter from Winthrop Sargent to General Wilkinson (June 4, 1792), in 3 TERRITORIAL
PAPERS, supra note 21, at 376-77.
98 Letter from Henry Knox to Winthrop Sargent (July 23, 1792), in Winthrop Sargent Papers
(on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 3 [second letter]).
99 Letter from Winthrop Sargent to Judge Symmes (June 4, 1792), in 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS,
supra note 21, at 377-78.
100 Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Winthrop Sargent (June 30, 1792), in Winthrop
Sargent Papers (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 3).
101 Id.
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Symmes hoped “the matter [would] die away altogether.”102 In one sense,
he got his wish. The Harrison matter, like the Shaw controversy, seemingly
faded; if there was a court decision, it does not survive. Yet it set the stage for
another, even more heated confrontation between Symmes and Sargent that
happened on Christmas that same year.
This time, the precipitating event was one of surprising legal import in
the Northwest Territory: the frivolous firing of guns in violation of territorial
statute. Symmes and Sargent unsurprisingly viewed this action very
differently. While Symmes saw musket firing as an “immemorial” custom that
should be indulged,103 Sargent read it as a dangerous practice that led
territorial citizens to ignore Indian attacks on the mistaken belief they were
harmless “common Sport.”104 From his first arrival in the Territory, Sargent
had repeatedly sought, often fruitlessly, to suppress what he believed to be
riotous behavior.105
On Christmas 1792, Sargent sought to avoid “disagreement amongst the
Citizens and military” by relying on the local militia, not the army, to police
Cincinnati and prevent gunfire.106 Yet the situation, if anything, grew worse,
producing riots that lasted over two weeks.107 The militia were mocked when
they tried to make arrests; the only two men apprehended were released
without bond; and soon, the rioters began shooting into houses.108 Sargent
knew who the ringleaders were—the lawyer Smith among them—and
appealed to Judge Symmes for assistance.109 Yet all Sargent got from Symmes
was a lengthy disquisition on allowing the people their whims. How could
such behavior be stopped, Symmes lectured, if the people condoned it?110
“Jurors will not indite—militia guards will not apprehend . . . and I shudder

Id.
Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Winthrop Sargent (Jan. 7, 1793), in Winthrop Sargent
Papers (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 3).
104 Orders to the Militia of Hamilton County (March 26, 1792), in 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS,
supra note 21, at 370-71.
105 See, e.g., “A Biographical Sketch of the Origen & Descent of Gen’l Benjamin Tupper
Connected with his Military Life” (on file with the Marietta, Ohio Collection, Folder 2). Firing off
guns, especially at Christmastime, was a traditional custom, particularly in the South. See STEPHEN
NISSENBAUM, THE BATTLE FOR CHRISTMAS 262 (1996).
106 Letter from Winthrop Sargent to Arthur St. Clair (Jan. 19, 1793), in Winthrop Sargent
Papers (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 3).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Letter from Winthrop Sargent to John Cleves Symmes (Jan. 6, 1793), in Winthrop Sargent
Papers (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 3).
110 See Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Winthrop Sargent (Jan. 7, 1793), in Winthrop
Sargent Papers (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 3 [second letter]).
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at the Idea of calling in the aid of the regular military; nor am I sure of success
if we did.”111
Finally, one night, Thomas McCulloch, himself a militiaman, was
discovered firing illegally.112 Because McCulloch was subject to military
justice, Sargent determined to try him before a court martial, imprisoning
McCulloch in Fort Washington in the interim.113 The example, Sargent
believed, at last caused peace and quiet to prevail.114 But Smith—the same
lawyer who filed on behalf of the artificier—quickly became McCulloch’s
counsel, obtaining a writ of habeas corpus from Judge Symmes.115 Rumor had
it, though, that Fort Washington’s commandant would refuse to honor the
writ—in which case, Smith threatened Sargent, he would show that the
service “cannot be refused.”116
Word of the habeas writ reached Sargent, along with reports that Smith
was boasting that he had gathered eighty men ready to free McCulloch.117
Sargent once again found himself in a difficult situation. If he honored the
writ, it would have “destroyed even the Shadow of Subordination with the
militia.”118 Yet if he refused to acknowledge it, the commandant might be
liable to a suit, and Sargent’s action might be deemed a “most arbitrary
measure.”119 Sargent decided to preempt the writ by quickly trying
McCulloch.120 He took the militiaman to his own house for court martial,
where a panel found McCulloch guilty of disobedience and sentenced him to
two weeks’ imprisonment.121
But McCulloch’s conviction did not settle the matter, as Sargent and
Symmes continued to battle. Sargent angrily complained to Symmes about
his interference, which he argued merely served to “encrease [sic] the
Turbulence of the licentious.”122 As it was, Sargent threatened that if
Id.
See Letter from Winthrop Sargent to Arthur St. Clair, supra note 106.
Id.
Id.
Letter from Jonathan Smith to [Thomas] Cushing (Jan. 13, 1793), in Winthrop Sargent
Papers (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 3).
116 Letter from Jonathan Smith to Winthrop Sargent (Jan. 24, 1793), in Winthrop Sargent
Papers (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 3).
117 See Letter from Winthrop Sargent to Arthur St. Clair, supra note 106.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Sargent did not make clear why he believed this action would allow him to avoid the writ.
Most likely, Sargent believed the proceeding would firmly settle that McCulloch was subject to
military discipline and therefore outside civil process, perhaps relying on Knox’s earlier endorsement
of that position. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
121 Letter from Winthrop Sargent to Arthur St. Clair, supra note 104; Militia Orders (January
14, 1793), in 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 21, at 396-97.
122 Letter from Winthrop Sargent to John Cleves Symmes (Jan. 13, 1793), in 3 TERRITORIAL
PAPERS, supra note 21, at 393-96.
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necessary, he would suspend the writ of habeas altogether: if he erred, “the
Sovereign Authority will correct me.”123 Symmes’s response was sparse but
clear. If Sargent attempted to suspend the writ, the question would come
before the court.124 Symmes noted only that even the British king could not
suspend habeas without the legislature’s concurrence.125 Although both
Symmes and Sargent indicated that they would submit to a decision by the
Washington Administration, once again the Administration was silent, and
so the matter went unresolved.
These recurrent conflicts between the territorial judges and executives are
susceptible of multiple interpretations. One view—that of the participants in
the territories—was that they were engaged in a contest over weighty
principles that followed a well-worn, Revolutionary-era script. The territorial
judges, especially Symmes, cast themselves as part of a heroic judicial
resistance against an overreaching and self-aggrandizing executive. For their
part, St. Clair and Sargent regarded themselves as upholding their duty to
safeguard the fragile and tentative authority of the new United States as the
only bulwark against licentiousness and disorder. Another view—widespread
among those outside the territories, as Edmund Randolph’s dismissive
remarks suggested126—regarded these conflicts as the petty clash of
overweening egos. In their correspondence, territorial officials on both sides
come off as peevish and arrogant, and both judges and territorial executives
all ultimately suffered ignominious fates, as their hubris undermined their
subsequent careers.127
Yet all these readings arguably distort. Although there was little love lost
between Symmes and Sargent, their fractious conflicts over jurisdiction were,
at root, structural. Contests between civil and military authority quickly
recurred, for instance, when the army moved its headquarters from
Cincinnati to Detroit: at one point, an army officer wielding an axe even
invaded the home of the county court clerk to recover a runaway sailor, which

Id. at 393.
Letter from John Cleves Symmes to Winthrop Sargent (Jan. 18, 1793), in Winthrop Sargent
Papers (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 3).
125 Id.
126 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
127 Congress ultimately recommended that Turner be investigated and removed from office, 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 151-52, 157 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., 1834); Sargent,
who became governor of the Mississippi Territory, similarly faced congressional investigation for
alleged misdeeds, id. at 233-41; Symmes, accused of abusing his office, watched his land speculation
empire collapse around him and died penniless, CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN CLEVES SYMMES,
supra note 51, at 21; and St. Clair was attacked by territorial citizens as a tyrant and was ignominiously
unseated by the Jefferson Administration weeks before his term was set to expire anyway, CAYTON,
supra note 12, at 70-72, 80.
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led to legal maneuverings predictably involving habeas writs.128 General
Wilkinson responded to these confrontations by declaring martial law over
the entire town, a move so bold it finally elicited a response from the (now)
Adams Administration. Warning that “[c]ollison” with “the Civil authority”
would “produce no good and must be attended with much evil,” Alexander
Hamilton urged Detroit’s commander to negotiate a resolution.129
Moreover, even though these struggles pitted judges against executives
and came clothed in legal garb, they were not, at core, judicial struggles. St.
Clair, Sargent, and military officials refused to accept the judgments of civil
courts in part because judicial supremacy was not well established in the Early
Republic,130 but their skepticism was arguably even more attributable to the
oddity of territorial government, which made territorial judges into
legislators and administrators.131 The result was that, in disputes over
constitutional authority, the judges acted less like impartial mediators than
combatants, slugging it out with executives not in courtrooms (almost none
of the disputes resulted in an actual civil proceeding) but in constant
correspondence. In this litigation by letter, both judges and executives
claimed to have the law on their side, and yet neither acknowledged the other
as arbiter of these claims. The only authority they both recognized was not a
court, but their higher-ups in the Washington Administration.
In short, although their disagreements resembled judicial politics,
territorial officials were actually locked in an administrative struggle over
their respective authority and the meaning of the Northwest Ordinance. The
continued refusal of their higher-ups to intervene meant that their testy
debates over constitutional interpretation persisted right up until the
Territory became a state.
C. The Military, Jurisdiction, and Administrative Constitutionalism
In 1802, representatives gathered to draft a constitution for the new state
of Ohio, to be carved from the Northwest Territory’s eastern portion. The
128 For the saga of the runaway sailor as it played out through correspondence, see Letter from
Peter Audrain to Winthrop Sargent (Jan. 20, 1798); Letter from David Strong to Winthrop Sargent
(Mar. 4, 1798); Letter from James Wilkinson to Winthrop Sargent (Mar. 6, 1798), all in Winthrop
Sargent Papers (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 4).
129 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to David Strong (May 22, 1799), in 23 PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 127, 128 (Harold C. Syrett, ed., 1976); see also Letter from James McHenry
to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 11, 1799), in 23 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra, at 32
(summarizing the correspondence of Brigadier General Wilkinson showing concern over the state
of martial law).
130 See generally LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
& JUDICIAL REVIEW 94-140 (2004).
131 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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new constitution’s bill of rights contained a provision, copied from other
states, mandating that “the military shall be kept under strict subordination
to the civil power.”132 But it also included a further, unprecedented stipulation
that “no person in this State, except such as are employed in the army or navy
of the United States or militia in actual service, shall be subject to corporal
punishment, under the military law.”133 This language suggests the legacy of
the Cincinnati fights over Shaw and Harrison: in the end, the bickerings of
the Territory’s administrative constitutionalism seemingly shaped the explicit
text written into state constitutions.
Yet Ohio’s constitutional provision was seemingly never tested, and was
stripped from the state’s Bill of Rights when it was rewritten in 1851.134 The
provision proved vestigial because, while controversies over military
jurisdiction had not ended, they had shifted westward, following the bulk of
the U.S. Army into new federal territories. There, disputes over military
authority recurred, as did the ambiguity that had marked these controversies
in the Northwest Territory.135
This durable uncertainty over the boundaries between civil and military
authority reflects, in one sense, the failure of administrative constitutionalism
in the Northwest Territory, at least from the perspective of many of the
disputes’ participants. Craving finality from some authoritative source that
they never got, these officials seemed trapped in perpetual argument. This
lack of conclusiveness was a particular problem for the kind of constitutional
controversy that plagued the Northwest Territory—the second-order
question over the authority to adjudicate itself. Territorial officials largely
agreed that there had to be some military sphere freed from civil control, but
sharply disagreed over who would determine that space. Military men like
Wilkinson believed merely acknowledging civil authority subordinated the
military, while Symmes and his allies insisted that the military had to submit
to civilian supremacy as a necessary precondition to the protection of its
autonomy. The insistence on both sides of their sole right to decide made
compromise impossible.
Yet the only institution that the participants acknowledged had the
jurisdiction, legitimacy, and authority to resolve these disputes—the
“Sovereign Authority of America,” as embodied in Congress and the national
executive136—remained silent even in the face of constant appeals and
OHIO. CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 20.
Id. § 21.
See OHIO. CONST. of 1851.
See, e.g., BETHEL SALER, THE SETTLERS’ EMPIRE: COLONIALISM AND STATE
FORMATION IN AMERICA’S OLD NORTHWEST 97–98 (2014).
136 Letter from Winthrop Sargent to John Cleves Symmes (May 10, 1792), in 3 TERRITORIAL
PAPERS, supra note 21, at 375-76.
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complaints. This silence mostly went unexplained, yet there were a handful
of indirect, yet suggestive, statements. Edmund Randolph’s dismissive
remarks about territorial “bickerings” indicate that at least some in the
Administration thought the underlying controversies too transient and local
to warrant intervention from Philadelphia. Even more telling was Secretary
of State Jefferson’s response to Judge Symmes’s complaint against Captain
John Armstrong: a “civil prosecution in the courts of the Territory,” Jefferson
told the President, was the “most proper” remedy.137
What these remarks suggest is a fundamental misunderstanding of the
nature of governance in the Northwest Territory—one based on the
appealing, yet flawed, analogy between territorial and state governments.
Implicitly relying on a sharp divide between local and national, Randolph and
Jefferson sought to keep the federal government free from messy disputes
they thought best resolved locally. But that was not how authority worked in
the Northwest Territory, where, as a matter of formal law, legitimate power
flowed from the center outward. Territorial officials like Symmes intuitively
understood that when they appealed up the hierarchy for vindication; as
Symmes knew all too well from experience, civil proceedings against officers
in territorial courts offered no resolution.
The problem for all involved was that they seemed to lack the theory or
language to articulate what they were doing. Just as the Northwest Ordinance
created a form of administrative law, territorial officials found themselves
engaged in administrative constitutionalism by default as they sought to fill
the gaps created by Congress’s broad delegation of authority. None of the
officials had any doubts about the legitimacy of this endeavor: on the contrary,
their letters brim with confidence and pious expressions of duty to the font
of their authority, the sovereign power of the United States. But this
responsibility, based partly on older imperial models of colonial governance,
bore an uneasy relationship to newer conceptions of popular sovereignty.
This tension between territorial governance and early American
republicanism may seem to echo present-day critiques of the administrative
state, but that perspective anachronistically ignores post-revolutionary
contexts. Federal administrators were not alone in seeking new vocabularies
to justify their actions; their uncertainties reflected the broader struggle in
the postwar United States to explain how any exercise of state power outside
popularly elected legislatures was legitimate. Territorial officials’ efforts to
articulate administrative constitutionalism most closely resembled the betterdocumented attempts by judges to explain how judicial review—a process
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Letter from Secretary of State to President, supra note 89.
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similarly rooted in prior precedents that smacked to many of imperial rule—
was compatible with the rule of the people.138
The current jurisprudential landscape demonstrates how successful judges
were in this effort. Over the past several decades, the questions swirling
around habeas and military authority, particularly in territories controlled by
the federal government, that arose in Cincinnati have not vanished; if
anything, they have grown more pressing. Moreover, these matters still
involve deep tensions between administrative and judicial claims to
adjudicative authority; the executive and the military still assert immunity
from civil jurisdiction. But officials no longer feel quite so free to disregard
judicial determinations. Instead, as these questions have become the subject
of high-stakes constitutional litigation, the jurisdictional question has been
heard and answered by the Supreme Court, which has declared itself to have
the final word. This legal landscape differs sharply from the world of the
Northwest Territory. There, a handful of contentious and bickering territorial
officials, neglected by their superiors, struggled to fill the interstices of the
new constitutional order as best they understood.139
II. “GONE TO THE UNITED STATES”: FEDERAL JURISDICTION,
IMPERIAL LAW, AND THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY
In 1795, a local magistrate wrote to territorial secretary Winthrop Sargent,
who was acting as governor while Arthur St. Clair was away on one of his
frequent visits to Philadelphia. The magistrate would have written to St.
Clair directly in Cincinnati, but “I hear he is gone to the U[nited] States.”140
This odd usage, at least to present-day readers, underscores the multiple
meanings of “United States” in the late eighteenth century. Sometimes, the
term referred specifically and only to the thirteen states collectively; in other
instances, it described the entire territory of the nation of the United States.
The result was that, depending on the definition used, the territories could
138 For works examining the early and contested history of judicial review, see generally SCOTT
DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT
JUDICIARY, 1606–1787 (2011); KRAMER, supra note 130; Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of
Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006); Theodore W. Ruger, “A Question Which Convulses a Nation”:
The Early Republic’s Greatest Debate about the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826 (2004);
William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005).
139 In Hamdi, the Supreme Court rejected the claim that the separation of powers limited its
authority to hear the case, concluding, “unless Congress acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas
corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of
governance . . . .” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). For a discussion of the Court’s
recent habeas cases in the context of the legal status of the territories, see Amy Kaplan, Where Is
Guantánamo?, 57 AM. Q. 831 (2005).
140 Letter from Henry Vanderburgh to Winthrop Sargent (April 30, 1795), in Winthrop
Sargent Papers (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 4).
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be either within or without the United States. This was not an idle semantic
debate: it had important legal implications hotly argued among federal
officials, particularly on whether ordinary congressional legislation
encompassed the territories. Even more significantly, this debate raised the
fundamental question of how much the new American empire would
resemble the old British empire, as proponents of earlier imperial practice
clashed with advocates who embraced newer conceptions of uniform
territorial sovereignty.
A. Unequal Footing
The British model was clear, at least in principle. All of Britain’s overseas
territories were colonies rather than part of Britain proper, and so excluded
from the scope of ordinary parliamentary legislation.141 But Britain’s colonies
were subject to Parliament’s legislative jurisdiction, which Parliament could
exercise by specifically naming the colonies within the statutory text.142 These
principles, established over long usage, became contested during the imperial
crisis. Anglo-Americans increasingly denied Parliamentary legislative
authority, first by distinguishing power over internal and external legislation,
and subsequently by arguing that their allegiance lay with the British king
alone.143
After their separation from Britain, citizens of the newly-created United
States spoke of creating their own American empire.144 Yet they used the term
“empire” differently from its British antecedents. Usually “empire” described
the extensive territory Anglo-Americans envisioned enfolding within the
United States; rarely did it imply a system in which an imperial center would
indefinitely govern the colonial periphery.145 Rather, from the end of the
Revolution onward, most Anglo-Americans assumed that the western
141 See, e.g., WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *108-09 (concluding that the British
colonies were “subject however to the control of the parliament, though . . . not bound by any acts
of parliament, unless particularly named.”)
142 Id.
143 For examinations of the constitutional arguments leading to the Revolution, see generally
JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2011);
JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1995);
Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1157 (1976).
144 See supra, note 36 and accompanying text.
145 Later in his life, Gouverneur Morris, one of the delegates to the constitutional convention,
recalled drafting the Admission and Property Clauses of the U.S. Constitution to permit the
exclusion of future states; he stated that he had envisioned subsequent acquisitions of Louisiana and
Canada as having “no voice in our councils.” But he also stated that had he made his views known,
“a strong opposition would have been made.” Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W.
Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 404, 404
(Max Farrand ed., 1911).
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territories would eventually become new states within the union.146 Both the
Constitution and the Northwest Ordinance codified this view: the
Constitution granted Congress the power to admit new states,147 while the
Ordinance promised that the territories would become states on “equal
footing” with the original thirteen once they reached sixty thousand white
male inhabitants.148 A sharp break from British law—James Monroe
described the promise of future statehood as the “remarkable & important
difference” between the Ordinance and British imperial precedent149—this
innovation occasioned little debate, perhaps reflecting Anglo-Americans’
long-standing experience with the creation of new and co-equal jurisdictions
such as towns and counties as a consequence of expansion.
This promise of ultimate statehood on equal terms has long served as the
principal evidence of the Ordinance’s anti-colonial and democratic
commitments. But the fact that the territories would eventually become states
did not resolve the territories’ status within the United States prior to
admission, a question on which the Constitution and the Ordinance were
largely silent. In this respect, the system of governance adopted for the
territorial period broke far less with earlier practice. With an appointed
governor and judiciary serving on good behavior, a two-house legislature with
appointed legislative council, and the right of disapproving laws vested in
Congress, territorial government strongly resembled British imperial
structures.150 One territorial citizen later described “ordinance Government”
as a “true transcript of our old English Colonial Governments;” “our
Governor,” he complained, “is cloathed [sic] with all the power of a British
Nabob.”151
As the Ordinance began to operate, territorial officials puzzled over this
mélange of old and new in thinking through the Northwest Territory’s
constitutional status. The question of the Territory’s position with respect to
the United States first emerged as territorial officials struggled to decide
146 For an example of an early assumption that the territories would be readily admitted as
states, see Draft Petition of Continental Army Officers to President and Delegates of Congress
(May 7, 1783), in Manuscripts and Documents of the Ohio Company of Associates, Special
Collections (on file with the Marietta College Library, Marietta, Ohio, Box 4, Folder 2),
http://cdm16824.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16824coll6/id/2924
[https://perma.cc/294F-PGTH] (stating that the territory is “of such a quality” that it might “in
time to be admitted one of the confedinated [sic] States of America”). For a thoughtful discussion
of the development of territorial governance, see ONUF, supra note 4, at 44-66.
147 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union”).
148 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 342.
149 Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 37, at 298.
150 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 335-39.
151 Letter from William Goforth to President (January 5, 1802), in 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS,
supra note 21, at 198.
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whether the Territory’s similarity to British colonies encompassed the rules
about parliamentary legislation. When Governor St. Clair and the judges for
the Northwest Territory (who, recall, also initially served as legislators)
gathered to enact laws for the territory, the judges expressed their “doubts
. . . whether the Laws of the united States can have course in the Territory
unless it be especially named in them.”152 The judges suggested formally
readopting federal statutes to ensure they had force within the Territory.153
There the matter lay, unresolved, until 1795. The previous year, Congress
enacted a tax on whiskey and other distilled spirits that had convulsed the
frontier.154 In passing, Governor St. Clair had earlier written to Secretary of
the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, suggesting that the revenue law did not
encompass the Territory, which was not named in the law.155 When St. Clair
repeated this view to Hamilton’s successor Oliver Wolcott, Wolcott could not
let the claim pass unnoticed.156 He found St. Clair’s suggestion that “the Laws
of the United States are not deemed to extend to either of the territorial districts unless
they are specially named” to be “an inadmissable pretension.”157 Wolcott
forwarded St. Clair’s letter to Attorney General William Bradford, who
confirmed Wolcott’s view. “There can be no doubt,” Bradford wrote to
Wolcott, “that all the laws of Congress, unless local in their nature or limited
in their terms, are, in their operation coextensive with the Territory of the
United States, and obligatory upon every person therein.”158 Bradford
reasoned that the Constitution compelled this result, as it required uniform
duties and imposts throughout the United States.159 He also pointed to
Article Four of the Northwest Ordinance, which stated that the territory and
the states formed from it “shall forever remain a part of this Confederacy of
the United States of America.”160 Wolcott forwarded Bradford’s letter to St.
Clair by way of rebuttal.
This legal dispute reflected a generational divide. Born in Scotland in
1737, St. Clair had first come to Pennsylvania as a British officer during the

152 Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Attorney General (Dec. 1790), in 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS,
supra note 40, at 319.
153 Id. at 320.
154 THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 160-61 (1986).
155 See Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Alexander Hamilton (Aug. 9, 1793), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR
PAPERS, supra note 66, at 317-18.
156 See Letter fom Oliver Wolcott to Arthur St. Clair (June 20, 1795), in id. at 385.
157 Id. (emphasis in original).
158 Letter from Attorney General to Secretary of the Treasury (June 19, 1795), in 2
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 40, at 520.
159 Id. at 520-21.
160 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 341.
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Seven Years’ War.161 Strongly rooted in earlier imperial law, St. Clair
responded to Wolcott’s dismissal of his argument by observing that, whatever
its merits, his claim was “no new pretension—and is a Doctrine which has
long been held with respect to colonies—and those Districts [the
territories] . . . have ever been considered in congress as colonies.”162 Wolcott
and Bradford, by contrast, were a good deal younger—Wolcott was 35 in 1795;
Bradford was 40—and had come of age during the American Revolution.163
Despite formal legal training at the Litchfield Law School, Wolcott claimed
to have never encountered the principle that St. Clair advanced. “[T]he
Doctrine is novel to me,” Wolcott told St. Clair, “and as I verily believe
erroneous.”164 Wolcott promised to “press for a judicial decision as soon as
possible” to resolve the question.165
Yet no judicial decision happened, and so, notwithstanding Wolcott’s
objections, St. Clair’s “pretension” about federal jurisdiction persisted. The
claim that territories had to be specifically named in federal legislation proved
particularly appealing whenever federal statutes veered toward echoes of the
imperial crisis because it allowed officials to avoid enforcing unpopular laws.
So, when Congress passed a stamp tax in 1797, a territorial magistrate wrote
to Secretary Sargent of his “Doubts” as to whether the Act encompassed “this
Territory . . . not being particularly named.”166 And when Congress prompted
a constitutional crisis with the enactment of the Sedition Act in 1798, Arthur
St. Clair clung to his old views in a letter to the Secretary of the State on the
law. “It has been assumed as a principle,” St. Clair wrote, “and it is, perhaps,
not an ill founded one, t[hat] the general Laws of the Union do not extend to
the territorial dependents except in cases where they are expressly named.”167
Displacing responsibility for this seemingly repudiated doctrine, St. Clair
noted that it was “most probable” that territorial judges would “apply th[is]
principle” in any prosecutions under the Sedition Act.168 The Secretary of
161 See Gregory Evans Dowd, Arthur St. Clair, AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY ONLINE
(2000),
http://www.anb.org/view/10.1093/anb/9780198606697.001.0001/anb-9780198606697-e0100850?rskey=vpDpuy&result=3 [https://perma.cc/CPT4-899T].
162 Letter from Gov. Arthur St. Clair to Secretary of the Treasury (July 24, 1795), in 2
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 40, at 523.
163 See Ethan S. Rafuse, Oliver Wolcott, AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY ONLINE (2000),
http://www.anb.org/articles/02/02-00344.html?a=1&n=wolcott%2C%20Oliver&ia=-at&ib=bib&d=10&ss=1&q=2 [https://perma.cc/S33L-4LUE].
164 Letter from Oliver Wolcott to Arthur St. Clair (Aug. 29, 1795), in Oliver Wolcott Papers
(on file with the Connecticut Historical Society, Box 16, Folder 13).
165 Id.
166 Letter from John Rice Jones to Winthrop Sargent (Oct. 17, 1797), in Winthrop Sargent
Papers (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 4).
167 Letter from Gov. St. Clair to Secretary of State (July 15, 1799), in 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS,
supra note 21, at 58 (alteration in original).
168 Id.
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State forwarded St. Clair’s letter along to the new Attorney General, Charles
Lee, who (likely unwittingly) reiterated Bradford’s earlier position.
“[S]urprised” by St. Clair’s claim, Lee stated his view that the “true rule” was
“that the General laws of the Union reach every part of the United States,
unless a particular and express exception be made.”169
For all the echoes of the imperial crisis in this debate, however, there was
an important difference. Unlike the revolutionaries who had denied
parliamentary authority, neither St. Clair nor the attorneys general sought to
cabin congressional power over the territories. St. Clair did not even disagree
with the conclusion that federal law applied uniformly throughout the United
States. For St. Clair, the relevant question was more fundamental: “whether
the Territory be a part of the United States” at all.170 In a lengthy letter to
Wolcott, St. Clair argued that it was “easy to prove” that it was not, and “that
the legislature have never considered them as such, but, on the contrary, as a
dependent colony.”171
St. Clair adduced substantial evidence. He noted that the territory had
had its government “imposed upon it by . . . [the] States, and if any thing can
be a proof of inferiority and dependence, it is this very thing.”172 He observed
that the territory was excluded from the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts.173 And he pointed out that the territory’s
inhabitants were denied a vote for representative in Congress or any officer,
which, if they were subject to federal law, seemed to run afoul of the
revolutionary principle that the “consent of the people” was “essential to give
laws a binding force.”174 St. Clair even turned on its head Bradford’s argument
about the pledge, in Article Four of Northwest Ordinance, that the territories
would forever remain part of the United States.175 This provision, St. Clair
insisted, was properly read as the “terms on which the colonies shall be
settled,” and became binding only once the territories sought to become
states.176 The alternate would suggest that “the United States made a compact
169 Letter from Attorney General to Secretary of State, in 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note
21, at 66. Much later, there would be a controversy over whether the federal government could
require documents to be stamped in state courts, Latham v. Smith, 45 Ill. 29 (1867), but this concern
did not extend to the territories, where the federal government enjoyed plenary power, Patterson v.
Gile, 1 Colo. 200 (1870).
170 Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Oliver Wolcott (December 5, 1795), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR
PAPERS, supra note 66, at 378. The printed version of the letter is undated; however, the manuscript
letter in the Arthur St. Clair Papers puts the date as Dec. 5. See Arthur St. Clair Papers (on file with
the Ohio Historical Society, Roll 4).
171 Id. at 379.
172 Id. at 379.
173 Id. at 381-82.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 382.
176 Id.
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with themselves,” which St. Clair thought “too great an absurdity” to be
conceded.177 For all these reasons, “[t]he truth is, the Territory is a
dependency of the United States, not as yet an integral part of them, but
capable of becoming so at a future day.”178
St. Clair’s conclusion that the territories were colonies of the United
States, subject to its authority and yet not integrated into the nation, laid bare
a deep and uncomfortable tension between republican principles and
territorial governance. For all the language in the Northwest Ordinance about
“fundamental principles of civil and religious libert[ies],” the Ordinance also
made the United States imperial in the older, British sense, since territorial
inhabitants remained subject to a distant government not of their choosing.179
“[I]f the [territory’s] inhabitants are a part of the people of the United States,”
St. Clair pointed out, “they are, at least, upon a very unequal footing with
their brethren.”180 St. Clair’s rhetorical inversion of the Ordinance’s famous
language about “equal footing” pointed out the large gap between the
Ordinance’s abstract promises and the realities apparent from a close reading
of its text. St. Clair’s proposed solution to this problem of inconsistency—
excising the territories from the United States altogether by labeling them
colonies—had the advantage of resolving the contradictions by creating
explicit boundaries of belonging that would serve to explain why so many
fundamental rights of self-governance seemed to be denied territorial
citizens. But St. Clair’s logical conclusion that U.S. inhabitants who moved
to territories “ceased to be the citizens of the United States and became their
subjects” was deeply unsettling in a nation created in an anti-imperial
revolt.181
Many inhabitants of the Northwest Territory came to agree with St. Clair
about their status, although they put a different valence on it. By 1800, the
personal and local disputes within the Territory had been enveloped within a
thick blanket of partisanship, as local factions aligned with the political parties
that had arisen in Philadelphia.182 A vocal movement of Jeffersonians, weary
of St. Clair and his chokehold on patronage, sought to replace the governor.183
Yet they began to fear that replacing St. Clair might only “be exchanging an
old and feeble tyrant for one more active and wicked.”184 So their critique
Id.
Id. at 380-81.
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 3, at 339.
Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Oliver Wolcott, supra note 170, at 379.
Id. at 383.
See CAYTON, supra note 12, at 68-80.
Id.
Letter from Stevens Thomson Mason to Thomas Worthington (Feb. 5, 1801), in 2 THE ST.
CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 66, at 531.
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
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broadened to encompass territorial government more generally. “They were
tired of the Colonial Yoke,” one wrote to President Jefferson;185 another stated
that he “reckon[ed] territorial government” as “a despotism.”186
In response to the clamor, in 1802 Congress enacted a law authorizing the
Territory to hold a constitutional convention in preparation for statehood.187
As St. Clair fought for his political life, he abandoned his earlier acceptance
of congressional authority. Instead, he adopted the prerevolutionary logic
denying parliamentary jurisdiction into his doctrine of territorial jurisdiction.
Congress, St. Clair argued, had legislative jurisdiction over the Territory in
its “corporative capacity,” but it lacked authority over the Territory’s “internal
affairs,” in which the Territory’s own legislature was competent.188 Congress’s
act requiring a convention, then, was a “nullity,” and the Territory’s
inhabitants were no more obligated by it “than we would be bound by an edict
of the first consul of France.”189 St. Clair’s airing of these platitudes of the
American Revolution led the Jefferson Administration to rapidly remove the
Federalist from office, even though he had mere weeks still to serve, for his
challenge to congressional authority.190 As for St. Clair’s critique, Ohio
gained statehood months later, making his analysis of territorial status moot
for the residents of the new state.
The debate over the constitutional status of the Northwest Territory thus
raged fiercest just as the territorial period was coming to an end. Many
offered sharply-worded critiques of territorial rule: St. Clair described it as a
form of government “which has been loaded with every epithet of
opprobrium which the English language affords.”191 Yet, for territorial
inhabitants discontented by the lack of self-government, the possibility of
following codified procedures to gain admission to the union made statehood,
rather than reform, seem the easier solution. The promise of statehood did
not solve the contradictions of republican imperialism; it obviated them.
Admission to the Union clarified Ohio’s status, yet, as with the issue of

185 Letter from John Smith to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 9, 1802), in 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS,
supra note 21, at 255.
186 Letter from Nathaniel Macon to Thomas Worthington (Sept. 1, 1802), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR
PAPERS, supra note 66, at 590.
187 Act of April 30, 1802, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 173.
188 Governor Arthur St. Clair, Remarks Before the Constitutional Convention (Nov. 3, 1802),
in 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS, supra note 66, at 594.
189 Id.
190 Letter from Secretary of State to Arthur St. Clair (Nov. 22, 1802), in 3 TERRITORIAL
PAPERS, supra note 21, at 260.
191 Governor Arthur St. Clair, Remarks Before the Constitutional Convention, supra note 188
at 594-595. For a fuller consideration of the debate over territorial status in the leadup to statehood,
see ONUF, supra note 4, at 66-87.
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military jurisdiction, the question of the relationship between the territories
and the United States persisted—somewhere else.
B. Constitutionalism and the American Empire
Ohio became a state in February 1803.192 Two months later, the United
States signed a treaty with France to purchase Louisiana, which encompassed
much of western North America.193 The governance of the new territory
quickly proved controversial in Congress, where representatives reprised the
disagreement between St. Clair and Wolcott over the status of newly acquired
territory and its residents. Both positions had advocates.194 Many embraced
Wolcott’s position and insisted that the new territory was fully part of the
United States, with all the constitutional rights and limitations this
concession implied. “We must . . . apply the Constitution to that people in
all cases or in none,” opined one representative.195 “We must consider that
country as being within the Union or without it—there is no alternative.”196
But others disagreed, arguing, following St. Clair, that the United States
could hold Louisiana as a colonial appendage without extending
constitutional rights or citizenship to its residents. The Constitution, they
argued, was a compact only among the states and did not encompass the
territories. “Congress . . . have a power in the Territories which they cannot
exercise in States,” one representative reasoned, “and the limitations of power,
found in the Constitution, are applicable to States and not to Territories.”197
The law that Congress ultimately passed created a government for
Louisiana similar to that for the Northwest Territory.198 It established several
presidentially appointed offices—a governor with a three-year term, a
secretary with a four-year term, and three judges with four-year terms rather
than life tenure—as well as a separate federally-appointed legislature of
“thirteen of the most fit and discreet persons of the territory.”199 But, although
the law’s imposition of a government without consent was not especially
novel, many thought it was. “This . . . is a Colonial system of government. It
is the first the United States have established,” John Quincy Adams
complained in opposing the Louisiana government bill.200 “It is a bad
Act of Feb. 19, 1803, ch. 7, 2 Stat. 201.
Treaty of Cession, U.S.–France, Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200.
See generally EVERETT SOMERVILLE BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
LOUISIANA PURCHASE: 1803–1812 (2000).
195 Id. at 110 (quotations omitted).
196 Id. (quotations omitted).
197 Id. at 88 (quotations omitted).
198 Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, 2 Stat. 283 (1804).
199 Id.
200 BROWN, supra note 194, at 131 (quotations omitted).
192
193
194
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precedent.”201 Present-day commentators have echoed Adams, stressing that
the Purchase “led to the creation of an ‘American Empire’” and
“revealed . . . the problematic constitutional status of the territories in a
United States to be governed of, by, and for the people.”202
Such comments, which casually excised over a decade of prior debate over
territorial governance, found their parallel in the U.S. Supreme Court. As it
happened, February 1803 was also when Court decided what was arguably its
first case on the constitutional status of the U.S. territories. In Clarke v.
Bazadone, the Court considered whether it had the power to hear an appeal
from the General Court of the Northwest Territory, even though that court
was on the verge of extinction.203 The plaintiff ’s counsel forcefully argued
that, even though Congress had not specifically authorized the Supreme
Court to hear such appeals, the Court inherently enjoyed that power as the
nation’s “one Supreme court.”204 “The very existence of the courts whose
judgment is complained of, is derived from the United States,” the attorney
argued.205 “All power and authority exercised in [the Northwest] territory
have emanated from the United States.”206 Yet, in a sentence-long opinion,
the Court rejected this position. Even though there were “manifest errors” in
the record, they concluded that they could not issue a writ of error without
congressional authorization.207
The Court’s sparse decision in Clarke implicitly vindicated St. Clair’s
position: the Court would not second-guess Congress’s power to treat the
territories differently from states, even if Congress excluded them from
fundamental constitutional structures.208 Yet Clarke seemed to vanish from
the Court’s subsequent decisions on territorial status.209 Two decades later, in
Loughborough v. Blake, Chief Justice John Marshall took the opposite tack.
Id. (quotations omitted).
Sanford Levinson & Bartholomex Sparrow, Introduction, in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND
AMERICAN EXPANSION, 1803–1898 1, 13 (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew Sparrow eds., 2005).
203 Clarke v. Bazadone, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 212, 214 (1803).
204 Id. at 213
205 Id. at 214.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Jim Pfander has convincingly suggested that Clarke reflected the view, emphasized by St.
Clair, that territorial citizens lacked federal rights to enforce before Article III courts. James E.
Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 643, 706-14 (2004).
209 The Court heard a similar case arising from the District of Columbia two years later, which
raised a similar question of whether the Constitution constrained Congress in legislating for the
territories. United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159 (1805). The court below had split, with a
majority embracing Wolcott’s position in favor of territorial uniformity, while one dissenting judge
echoed St. Clair in excluding the territories from many constitutional restraints. Id. at 160 n.2. As
in Clarke, however, the Court declined to decide the case on the grounds that Congress had not
authorized jurisdiction. Id. at 172-74.
201
202
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Interpreting the application of a revenue statute to the District of Columbia,
Marshall reasoned that the term “United States” designated the “whole . . .
of the American empire,” so that territories were “not less within the United
States, than Maryland or Pennsylvania.”210 Marshall waved away the
complaint that the territories were taxed without representation—“that great
principle which was asserted in our revolution”—by pointing to the promise
that the territories “look[ed] forward to complete equality” upon
admission.211 Yet eight years later, in American Insurance Company v. Canter,
Marshall seemingly changed course.212 Echoing but not citing Clarke, he
upheld the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction by Florida’s territorial courts,
stating that Article III’s limitation on federal judicial power within the states
“does not extend to the territories,” where “Congress exercises the combined
powers of the general, and of a state government.”213
The disappearance of Clarke mattered because the Northwest Territory
increasingly became the normative yardstick against which subsequent
territories were measured and, often, found lacking. In Dred Scott, for
instance, Chief Justice Roger Taney sought to resolve the tension between
Loughborough and Canter by distinguishing two kinds of federal territories.214
In a challenge to the congressional power to bar slavery in the territories—a
provision that first appeared in the Northwest Ordinance—Taney argued that
federal power under the Territories Clause was limited solely to territories
held at the time of the Constitution’s adoption; it did not encompass the
subsequently acquired territory at issue in the case.215 In other words, Taney
carved out an exception for the Northwest Ordinance that at once explained
and rendered irrelevant what one dissent called a “settled construction of the
Constitution for sixty years.”216
Nearly a century after Ohio’s statehood, the Court issued arguably its
most influential decision on territorial status, Downes v. Bidwell, the most
significant of the early twentieth-century Insular Cases that sought to clarify
the position of newly-acquired U.S. territories overseas.217 Although the
case’s multiple opinions rested heavily on historical practice and precedent,
Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 319 (1820).
Id. at 324.
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
Id.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
Id. at 432-42.
Id. at 546 (McLean, J., dissenting). For fuller consideration of this line of cases, see
Cleveland, supra note 22, at 181.
217 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). For additional background on the Insular Cases,
see generally RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE
AMERICAN EMPIRE (Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko Brown-Nagin eds., 2015); and BARTHOLOMEW
H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006).
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the Northwest Ordinance played a surprisingly minor role: writing for the
majority, Justice Brown offered a flat declaration that, reading the Northwest
Ordinance and the Constitution, “it can nowhere be inferred that the
territories were considered a part of the United States.”218 Brown’s ultimate
conclusion that the territory of Puerto Rico was, at least for the purposes
before the Court, “not a part of the United States” vindicated St. Clair nearly
a century after his death.219 Yet it was Justice White’s concurring opinion that
proved the most durable and influential. Like Taney, White drew a sharp
dichotomy between different territories, in his case distinguishing
“incorporated” territories—those placed on the path toward statehood—and
the “unincorporated” territories, where Congress had a freer hand.220 For
White, the hallmarks of incorporation were the features of the Northwest
Ordinance: the extension of constitutional rights and the promise of statehood.221
Viewed in light of the early debates in the territories, Downes is a deeply
ironic decision. The Justices’ disagreements over the territories’
constitutional status echoed, almost uncannily, the arguments between St.
Clair and the Attorneys General over a century earlier. But, even though the
reasoning in Downes relied extensively on prior practice, particularly
administrative practice, the Justices fixated on the history of Louisiana, not
the Northwest Territory.222 This omission likely reflected the unavailability
of those prior administrative debates: unlike federal officials’ extensively cited
views on the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase, the Attorneys’
General opinions on the status of the Northwest Territory were
unpublished.223 Yet the absence of those debates allowed the Justices to offer
a very different account of the history of territorial governance than that
suggested by St. Clair and territorial citizens. Both the governor and his
political opponents had viewed the Northwest Ordinance as a colonial
document that controversially denied powers of self-government. A century
later, however, Justice White spun a story of incorporation by ignoring the
Ordinance’s imposition of federal rule and focusing exclusively on its promise
of fundamental rights and eventual statehood: “at the adoption of the
Constitution,” White lyricized, “all the native white inhabitants” of both
states and territories were “endowed with citizenship” and “enjoy[ed] equal
Downes, 182 U.S. at 250-51.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 287-88 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 319-20.
See, e.g., id. at 251-56, 268, 324-33.
The correspondence between the Secretary of State, Attorneys General, and St. Clair did
not appear in either the American State Papers or in the Offi cial Opinions of the Attorney General, both
of which were relied on extensively by the Court in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See
generally Gregg v. Forsyth, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 179 (1860); Bryan v. Forsyth, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 334
(1856); Watkins v. Holman’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 25 (1842).
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rights and freedoms.”224 This change in perspective made early territorial
governance seem the antithesis of the colonial order that the United States
sought to establish in Puerto Rico and elsewhere.
The Insular Cases thus reflected a bifurcation that began in the nineteenth
century and still persists: Americans came to celebrate the Northwest
Ordinance as embodying a new system of democratic expansion even as they
feared subsequent territorial extensions as a betrayal of self-governance and
an embrace of colonialism. Yet this dichotomy is only tenable by reading the
Ordinance very partially, and by ignoring what people in the territories
actually said and thought about it. Early Americans recognized that the
Northwest Ordinance was not an unambiguous charter of liberty and
democracy, and that the new American empire had buried within it many of
the contradictions of the old. They struggled to reconcile this colonial legacy
with the nation’s newly pronounced constitutional principles; some, like
Arthur St. Clair, thought territorial governance so inconsistent with
republican constitutionalism that the Northwest Territory could not really be
part of the nation at all.
Recovering the history of administrative constitutionalism in the
Northwest Territory does little to solve the fundamental question of
territorial status, on which the Insular Cases, for now, remain the final word.
Like the better-known debates over Louisiana that ensued a decade later, the
arguments among territorial officials in the Northwest Territory show mostly
how contested and uncertain territorial status remained even after the
adoption of the Constitution and the Northwest Ordinance.
What these debates do demonstrate, however, is the mistaken assumption,
embraced by many scholars, that the United States’ creation in an anticolonial revolt entrenched principles of uniformity, self-governance, and
limited federal power at odds with imperialism.225 In fact, from the
beginning, the United States, like its British predecessor, was an empire that
excluded its subjects—even those white male property owners normally
deemed citizens—from self-governance. One way to interpret this
contradiction was as territorial citizens did, as the nation hypocritically failing
to follow its own constitutional ideals. Yet a more accurate reading is to
acknowledge the existence of another, countervailing set of constitutional
norms, ones grounded in power and territorial sovereignty. The Northwest
Downes, 182 U.S. at 320 (White, J., concurring).
For examples of works that see a substantial break between the Insular Cases and earlier
constitutional practice, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 14; Cleveland, supra note 22, at 20914. But as Christina Ponsa-Kraus has astutely pointed out, the divide between the position of
“incorporated” and “unincorporated” territories has been overdrawn. Although Ponsa does not
discuss this early history traced here, it reinforces her claims. Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States:
American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 800 (2005).
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Territory’s embrace of federal authority and deprivation of self-governance
arguably embodied these imperial principles. In this sense, then, as well as in
its much-heralded protection of individual rights, the Ordinance was a
constitutional document.
CONCLUSION
In 1935, Congress created a commission to celebrate the one hundredfiftieth anniversary of the Northwest Ordinance, a law that, Congress
proclaimed, had made “such a complete change in the method of governing
new communities formed by colonization, that it will always rank as one of
the greatest civil documents of all time.”226 A sweeping commemoration
followed: over two million people came out to watch a reenacted westward
procession to Ohio.227 At the procession’s final destination, after a pageant
featuring a cast of over one thousand, the chairman of the local organizing
committee gave a speech.228 He invoked the Ordinance as embodying “our
cherished democratic forms of government” before offering a warning: that
legacy, he urged, was now under threat from the expansion of the federal state
under the New Deal.229
It was chance that the Ordinance’s sesquicentennial coincided with the era
that scholars identify as the rise of the modern administrative state in the
United States, yet it was also fitting. As the chairman’s speech exemplified,
the memory of the Ordinance had sharply diverged from the bitter
complaints of territorial citizens: the document that they had decried as
undemocratic had now become one of the founding texts of American
democracy. A more accurate history might have suggested continuity between
the Ordinance and the New Deal state rather than rupture, given the deep
interconnections between the history of administration and the territories.
In particular, administration and territorial governance posed similar
conceptual challenges within early American constitutionalism. As Dan
Hulsebosch has written, supporters of the Constitution believed they could
solve the “long quest . . . for a binding imperial law” by transforming the
United States from a system in which the “metropolis . . . imposed law on the
periphery” into one founded on “a new kind of legality based on transcendent
rules.”230 As many have traced, such transcendence could only be achieved by

226 H.R.J. Res. 208, 74th Cong., ch. 249, 49 Stat. 511 (1935).
227 JOHN BODNAR, REMAKING AMERICA: PUBLIC MEMORY,
PATRIOTISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 126–34 (1992).
228 Id.
229 Id. at 130-31 (quotations omitted).
230 HULSEBOSCH, supra note 34, at 258.
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shunting aside the exceptions—enslaved Africans,231 Native peoples,232
women,233 children234—that troubled this project. The territories and
administration presented a different sort of challenge. Both were
constitutionalized holdovers from the earlier imperial regime that fit uneasily
within a system in which governance purported to rest on consent and what
would later be deemed “the rule of law” for legitimacy. Both seemed to cling
to an older logic in which authority radiated hierarchically, outward and
downward from the imperial center, rather than arising from popular
sovereignty. Celebration of the Northwest Ordinance notwithstanding, then,
the early United States failed to solve the legal problem of empire presented
in the American Revolution—that is, how to ground legitimate authority and
sovereignty within colonial dependencies. Or, rather, the United States
“solved” the problem by sidelining it.
The implications of this history for the ongoing fights over the
constitutionality of the administrative state are twofold. As a descriptive
matter, it demonstrates that a category of positive law akin to modern
administrative law not only existed during the creation of the United States,
but was explicitly sanctioned by its foundational documents. The denial of
this history rests on a tendentious, results-oriented narrative that is
constrained to ignore or distinguish away substantial contradictory evidence.
This effort—to cast as “exceptional” instances that might otherwise trouble
an unquestioning faith in the nation’s fundamental republicanism—echoes
the broader history of the territories’ place within the U.S. constitutional
imagination. From the Northwest Territory onward, many Americans
similarly found it simpler to write the territories out of the United States
altogether rather than to attempt to reconcile undemocratic territorial
governance with the new nation’s ostensible commitments.
But, while analogs of present-day administrative law have existed since
the nation’s creation, they also at times proved a particularly congenial tool
for serving normatively undesirable ends. Early on, territorial governance
established the long-standing pattern—obvious in the current War on Terror
or fights over immigration—in which federal administrators’ authority was at
its height in places imagined as outside the constraints of “ordinary”
231 See, e.g., GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION: SLAVERY,
POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010); DAVID
WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION (2009).
232 See, e.g., AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (2010); Maggie
Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2019).
233 See, e.g., ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, REVOLUTIONARY BACKLASH: WOMEN AND POLITICS
IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2007).
234 See, e.g., HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, AND THE ANGLOAMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY (2005).
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constitutional jurisdiction. There, beyond the limitations of federalism or
democratic accountability, federal officials and military officers enjoyed
seemingly unfettered authority, at least as depicted by territorial residents.
I have argued elsewhere that the Constitution served as much to facilitate
as to restrain imperialism.235 The supposed exceptions of administration and
the territories suggest that this was true for what the document did not say
as well as for what it did. The “holes” that others have identified in the
Constitution concerning both administration and territorial governance—
more accurately broad grants of indefinite authority—facilitated the
repurposing of older imperial law and created spaces where constitutional
silence aggrandized federal power. These omissions helped construct an
imperial power grounded on inequalities even as the new nation celebrated
the comforting myth that it was a new kind of empire founded on equality
and liberty.
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See Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999 (2014).
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